Refugee Status Appeals Authority 

REFUGEE APPEAL NO. 73889/02

AT AUCKLAND

Before:                                  D J Plunkett (Chairperson)
                                            J Baddeley (Member)

Representing the Appellant:    Rachel Smyth

Date of Hearing:                     29 and 30 October 2002

Date of Decision:                   19 December 2002


DECISION DELIVERED BY J BADDELEY

 

[1] This is an appeal against a decision of a refugee status officer of the Refugee Status Branch (RSB) of the New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS) declining the grant of refugee status to the appellant, a citizen of Pakistan.

THE INTERPRETATION ISSUE

[2] At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the appellant requested an Urdu or Pakistani Pushtu speaking interpreter.  The interpreter provided for the hearing was a Pushtu speaker from Afghanistan.  It was agreed by both the interpreter and the appellant that the Pushtu used in Pakistan was the same as that used in Afghanistan but in addition contained some Urdu words.  The interpreter advised that he did not speak Urdu but it was agreed that he would check carefully with the appellant the meaning of any Urdu expressions used and the equivalent Pushtu expression would be provided.  This interpreter had previously been used for this appellant at the RSB interview.  At that interview, the appellant was represented by counsel.  There is no record anywhere on the file of any objection having been raised to the use of the interpreter at the RSB hearing (indeed he had confirmed to the refugee status officer that he did not have any objection to the interpreter). 

[3] However, counsel had requested by letter several weeks before the hearing date that an Urdu or Pakistani Pushtu interpreter be provided.  Counsel argued that it was the appellant’s "right" to have the interpreter requested. 

[4] After reiterating to the appellant that he should raise any interpretation concerns immediately, the Authority asked the appellant what objection he had to the interpreter provided.  He replied that the relationship between the Afghani and the Pakistani governments at the present time was not good.  He was asked whether his objection to the interpreter was therefore a political one rather than an objection on the grounds of the interpreter’s competence.  He replied that the only objection he had was political.  The Authority ruled that the hearing would proceed with the interpreter provided.

[5] Regular checks were made throughout the hearing with the appellant to ascertain whether there were any difficulties with interpretation.  At the end of the first session before the morning adjournment, the appellant was asked whether he had any concerns with the interpreter, he replied that up to then there had been no problems.  After the luncheon adjournment, the appellant’s counsel again raised her objections to the interpreter saying that her client wanted an Urdu interpreter.  She said that although up to that time the questions had been only about personal matters, later when there were questions asked concerning the appellant’s political opinion, she was of the view that issues and problems could arise.  She also advised that her client had said that the interpreter had been fine up till the present time.  She sought an adjournment to take further instructions from her client and this was granted.  At the end of this adjournment, the Authority again asked whether the appellant had experienced any interpretation problems.  The appellant replied that he had no objection to the interpreter because no "deep" issues had yet been discussed.  The hearing accordingly proceeded. 

[6] Prior to the afternoon adjournment, the Authority again sought confirmation from the appellant concerning the interpretation issues.  He replied that he had three problems in the previous session. 
(a) He gave the example of himself having used an English word: "agitation" which the interpreter had also used.   


(b) The appellant was also concerned that the interpreter had used the word "country" rather than countryside although in the context it was clear that the interpreter was referring to a rural area as opposed to an urban area. 


(c) The appellant then raised the fact that the interpreter had used the words "black turban" to describe a particular gang.  The interpreter confirmed that the appellant had actually used the Pushtu words for black turban and the exact translation had been given. 
[7] It was abundantly clear to the Authority that no misunderstanding had arisen in regards to any of these three trivial areas of concern.

[8] At the end of the first day’s hearing, the appellant was again asked whether there had been any interpretation difficulties.  He replied that he had no problems with the interpreter at present.

[9] At the commencement of the hearing the following day counsel for the appellant presented written submissions concerning the interpretation issue which have been considered by the Authority here.  She drew attention to several matters which she felt had been potentially problematic in the interpretation the previous day.  Of these matters, two had been resolved during the hearing the previous day and the others were either due to the appellant’s inability to recall certain dates (from which no adverse inference has been taken) or were matters that were unproblematic to the Authority.  Counsel for the appellant also noted that dates of incidents had been given with some difficulty.  However the appellant himself had on occasion given dates in English which were incorrect.  This difficulty arose because of the appellant’s desire to provide dates in English rather than in Pushtu, but again is not an issue of concern to the Authority.

[10] The hearing on the second day proceeded with an Urdu interpreter, there was no marked difference in the appellant’s ability to respond to questions using the Urdu interpreter.  Counsel for the appellant raised the concern that on the first day it had been necessary to repeat questions several times before the appellant answered.  However this characteristic way of responding was as marked on the second day as it had been on the first.  The change in interpreter did not affect the need to repeat questions on occasion. 

[11] At the end of the hearing, the appellant was again asked whether proceeding with the Afghani interpreter had impeded his ability to give evidence.  He replied that there were some words which were different in Pushtu.  However he confirmed that he was able to express everything he had wanted to because all the questions were very simple and he had answered them simply.

[12] In conclusion, counsel again submitted that the appellant had a right to express himself in the language of his choice.  She also argued that her client had been prejudiced because he had found it very stressful using an Afghani interpreter rather than a Pakistani one.  She particularly noted that there were certain intimate details which he felt precluded from mentioning when the Afghani interpreter was used.  She was invited to seek details of this from her client and the appellant replied that if anything about Afghanistan had come up, the interpreter might not have been pleased with his answer.  Further he did not want to annoy anybody in the small Afghani community.  However when asked again what evidence he felt constrained about presenting he said that because no difficult questions were asked, the fact that an Afghani interpreter had been used had made no difference to him.

[13] By letter dated 25 November 2002 counsel requested that she be advised of any potentially prejudicial matters which had arisen on the first day of hearing and that her client be given the chance to comment on them.

[14] By letter dated 3 December 2002 the Authority advised in reply that all potentially prejudicial matters were put to him during the course of the hearing.

The Provision of an Interpreter

[15] There is a statutory obligation on all refugee decision-makers to provide an independent interpreter at an interview where the first language of the appellant is not English.  The Immigration (Refugee Processing) Regulations 1999 (SR1999/285) Regulation 20 provides:

"20: Provisions of Independent Interpreters at Interviews -

1. It is the responsibility of the relevant refugee status officer or the Authority, as the case may require, to arrange the attendance of an independent interpreter at an interview where the first language of the claimant or appellant or person whose refugee status is in question is not English.  It is it should be noted that this provision is framed in terms of a statutory duty to provide an independent interpreter, rather than the "right" of the appellant to have an interpreter of his or her choice. 

[16] The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 are both to similar affect.  The ICCR provision is as follows:

"In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone should be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:

(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in Court."

[17] The grounds on which a valid objection can be made to an interpreter are set out in Refugee Appeal No. 70975/95 (3 December 1998).  Essentially this is confined to competence, accuracy and bias (lack of independence).  The standard of interpretation required has been considered in A v Refugee Status Appeals Authority (2001) NZAR 348 at [32] where it was held that while the standard of interpretation should be high it need not be one of perfection.  There has to be a degree of realism as interpreting from one language to another is not a precise science.  Further this Authority in Refugee Appeal No. 72752/01 (15 November 2001) has considered the question of the provision of an interpreter and found as follows:

"The duty under Regulation 20 of Immigration Refugee Processing Regulations 1999 to arrange for the attendance of an independent interpreter as an interview where the first language of the claimant is not English is not an unrestricted one.  Nor under International Human Rights instruments is the right to an interpreter an unrestricted one … Although not necessary for the purposes of this decision we are also of the view that a claimant cannot refuse to proceed with an interview in a language in which the claimant is sufficiently proficient even though the language is not of the claimant’s choice nor in a language in which the appellant normally expresses him or herself."

[18] From the aforementioned authorities and statutory provisions, it is clear that an appellant does not have the "right" to an interpreter of his or her choice.  His right is to an interview in a language in which he is sufficiently proficient.  He has no right to another interpreter because he feels uncomfortable with the one provided on political grounds.  It must be remembered that in Auckland, and more so in other centres in New Zealand, there is only a limited pool of competent, experienced interpreters.
[19] It was abundantly clear to the Authority throughout the hearing that the appellant was sufficiently proficient in both Urdu and Pushtu (where the Afghani interpreter was used) to adequately express himself and fully present his claim to the Authority.  Even on his own evidence his claimed prospective fears about the interpretation expressed at the beginning of the hearing were not realised.

THE APPELLANT’S CASE

[20] The appellant is a 45 year old Sunni Muslim who has lived most of his life in Peshawar.  At the present time his wife and ten children are living in the family house which was built for them in 1992.  This is situated about six or seven kilometres out of Peshawar in Z village.  The appellant’s oldest son A, aged 22 is employed selling bricks.  His second son B is a student at a madrassa and his third son is an unemployed tailor.  His wife, eight sons, two daughters and four grandchildren all live together in the village of Z.  The appellant also has four brothers and five sisters who live in the vicinity of Peshawar.

[21] The appellant completed eight years schooling and thereafter supported himself by casual work until 1973 when he began studying at the Arabic Islamic Institute.  He specialised in studying the Koran.  He began working for a Sunni Islamic organisation and married in 1972.  In 1984 he started teaching Arabic in a high school.  In the following years he travelled to Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia on missionary work.  In 1987 he returned to Peshawar and joined the SSP, a party which promotes the interests of Sunni Muslims. 

[22] The appellant has attained the status of Qari, a person who has knowledge of and ability in correctly reciting the Koran this enables him to lead prayers in the mosque. 

[23] The appellant became the secretary of a local branch of the SSP in Peshawar.  His duties involved arranging meetings, collecting donations and arranging speakers.  He himself gave speeches at public meetings, in squares and bazaars around Peshawar.  In his speeches he urged the government to stop Shia Muslims from offending against the fundamental tenets of Sunni Muslim beliefs. 

[24] In 1990 or 1991 the appellant went to Brazil for four months on missionary work.

[25] On 22 February 1990 Haq Nawaz, the local Sunni leader was assassinated.  Thereafter the appellant ceased all his activities and involvement in the SSP.  The reason he gave for this was that he did not wish to be involved in the violence which had broken out between the Shia and Sunni.  He had no problems with the authorities during the time he was working for the SSP because "he did nothing to create problems".  However after the death of his leader in February 1990, he claims that police began looking for him as part of their investigation into the killings of both Shia and Sunni people.  He said that these enquiries and searches began after he had gone to Australia in 1992. 

[26] Since 1991 the appellant has spent most of his time out of Pakistan teaching Arabic and religious subjects in Fiji and Australia.  On 29 February 1992 he arrived in Australia where he taught until September 1992.  He returned home to his wife and family for two months and at that time signed a contract for the building of their present home in Z village. 

[27] After leaving Australia, he had negotiated a three-year contract with a Fiji Muslim League to teach in that country.  In 1993 he took his son, A back to Fiji with him after A had been detained by police for participating in a public demonstration. 

[28] Until his arrival in New Zealand in May 1996, the usual pattern of his life from 1993 to 1996 was to teach in Fiji for 10 months of the year and spend the remaining two months in Pakistan with his family in their village.  In the course of his travels, he visited Australia nine times spending anything from two days to two weeks there.  In 1996 he returned to Fiji but became unwell so he came to New Zealand in May 1996 for an operation.  He claimed refugee status some five months later.

[29] The basis of the appellant’s claim to refugee status is:
(a) Fear of militant Shia in particular one group the TJP.
(b) Fear of the Pakistani police.
[30] Although the appellant himself has never been harmed in Pakistan, he claims that this has been because he has not been in the country.  Had he in fact remained there he would have been either killed by the TJP or a false case brought against him by the police.  He cites the assassination of various SSP leaders as the basis of his fear claiming that he too is a target of Shia terrorists.  There has also been interest shown in him and his family by the police since his departure from the country in 1992.

[31] In late 1992, his oldest son, A, was arrested at a demonstration.  He had been hit by the police who were using sticks to disperse the crowd.  He was then detained for a couple of days at the police station.  The appellant took the son with him to Fiji and he returned to Pakistan the following year.

[32] The appellant’s oldest son A was again arrested from a demonstration, in 1996, and detained for two or three days.  After that the police came to the appellant’s home in Z village.  This was at a time of political unrest focussed on the Malkand Agency area.  The police evidently accused the appellant’s son of being a member of the militant Black Turban organisation.  The police also took the appellant’s photograph from the home and a record of the address of the house.  They made enquiries of the appellant’s whereabouts and his son told them that he was overseas.  No member of his family have been harmed or detained since 1996.

[33] The appellant’s claims that the police make various enquiries whenever there are killings or assassinations.  They make enquiries of his family because he was a former secretary of the SSP.  Although he has not been active in this organisation since 1990, he claims the police interest continues because they are working off "old records".  The appellant has heard that one of his brothers was detained once during the month of Muharram although he says that this detention has nothing to do with him as far as he knows. 

[34] In December last year the appellant received a letter from the general secretary of the SSP in Peshawar warning him not to return to Pakistan and saying that Shia terrorists have murdered a number of SSP scholars.  He also received a letter from his son in March 2000 to similar effect.  The SSP was recently banned by President Musharraf and is currently an illegal organisation.

[35] The appellant claims that he has feared being assassinated by Shias since the death of his leader in February 1990.  Since 1996, as a result of letters sent to him in New Zealand by his family he also fears that the police might make a false case against him and have him arrested because he is a former member and secretary of the SSP.

[36] No harm has come to any of his family members in Pakistan, apart from the arrests of his sons referred to.  The appellant believes that it is only the leaders (like himself) who are in danger not their family members.  He said the main problem for his family is that they are unable to leave their village because of fear of Shia attacks.  This means that the children are restricted to a village education and cannot take advantage of the educational facilities available in Peshawar city, six or seven kilometres away. 

[37] Counsel filed submissions dated 24 October 2002 enclosing country information principally concerned with sectarian violence.  These submissions and the supporting country information have been taken into account in this decision.  Further leave was granted for letters from the appellant’s family to be produced.  The translation of these letters was received by the Authority on 25 November 2002.  The two letters (are dated 12 August 1996 and the other undated) are from his family.  One refers to the birth of his youngest child and congratulates the appellant on his operation.  The second (undated) described an enquiry from the police to which the family replied by saying they were unaware of the appellant’s whereabouts.  The letter also "strongly requests" the appellant not to come to Pakistan.

THE ISSUES

[38] The Inclusion Clause in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention relevantly provides that a refugee is a person who:-

"... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

[39] In terms of Refugee Appeal No. 70074/96 (17 September 1996), the principal issues are:

(a) Objectively, on the facts as found, is there a real chance of the appellant being persecuted if returned to the country of nationality?

(b) If the answer is yes, is there a Convention reason for that persecution?

ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLANT’S CASE

[40] The Authority accepts that the appellant is a Sunni Muslim who has left his family in Pakistan to travel extensively over the last ten years teaching Arabic and the Koran.  His passport confirms the details of his travel.  Beyond this, the Authority does not find critical aspects of the appellant’s account to be credible.  In particular, the appellant’s account of persecution at the hands of the militant Shia group (TJP) and the police in Pakistan was presented at the appeal hearing in a way which bore scant resemblance to the version he had given to the RSB.  Two lynchpins of his account namely: the harm he and his family had suffered at the hands of Shia and the family experiences of recent harassment at the hands of the police had been severely eroded in the evidence presented before the Authority.  This has caused the Authority to conclude that neither the accounts of past persecution nor the professed fear of future harm are credible and accordingly there is no real chance of persecution on return.  The reasons for our findings follow:
(a) Fear of Shia

The appellant’s claimed fear of Shia terrorists was presented to the RSB on the following terms:

(i) He began to fear Shia terrorists after the assassination of his leader on 22 February 1990.  Many Sunni leaders had been killed by Shia.


(ii) In 1991 he was run down by a car driven by members of the TJP and suffered head injuries.  At about the same time he was attacked twice by Shia while travelling on the bus - his clothes were torn and he was punched.


(iii) In his absence overseas, his family’s home was raided by Shia eight or nine times since November 1996.  The family did not report these raids to the police.

At the hearing before the Authority the appellant was surprisingly unforthcoming given the detailed account he had given to the RSB of harassment and victimisation by Shia.  He was asked three times whether he had ever been attacked by Shia.  He replied he was away overseas.  After the third such enquiry, it was put to him that he had told the RSB that he had been run down by Shia.  This prompted his memory of the incident but he denied actually knowing whether those responsible were Shias.  He then said he suspected they may have been Shia because at the time his group had taken a case against Shia.  He was then asked if there were any other occasions of assaults by Shia, but he replied that there were not.  When reminded of the two personal assaults on the bus he had described to the refugee status officer he replied that he could not recall these. 

The Authority asked the appellant whether he or his family had experienced any attacks or assaults from the Shia since 1991.  He replied that his family had no problems - "only the leader suffers".  He had previously given evidence that he had not personally been harmed in any way by Shia since 1991, the Authority asked whether his family had been attacked, harassed or experienced any problems from Shia.  He replied that they were afraid to leave their village to attend school in the city because of the presence of Shia.  He was referred to the account given to the RSB of eight or nine raids on his home by Shia in or about 1996.  This account was contained in a letter written by his lawyer as a reply to the RSB interview report.  To the Authority he denied any knowledge of these raids. 

The appellant’s account of Shia hostility has reduced from Shia raiding his home and assaults on him personally [as told to the RSB] to one occasion when he was knocked off his bicycle by unknown people [his evidence to the Authority].  The version presented to the Authority is not evidence of past persecution and provides no basis for the existence of a prospective harm from Shia on return.  Furthermore the variability and unreliability of his evidence over time causes the Authority to conclude that he does not have even a genuine, subjective fear of Shia.

(b) Fear of Police

The appellant’s evidence at the RSB was that the police continue to pursue him because of his previous position as secretary of the SSP and their continued interest in him has resulted in harassment of his family.

His evidence in a letter from his lawyer (dated 29 February 2002) replying to the RSB interview report was that his brother had been arrested and questioned every year in the month of Muharram since the appellant’s departure from Pakistan.  He was taken in 2002 and this happened frequently.  He was warned by the police not to give any public speeches.  Whenever there were incidents of sectarian violence, his brother was arrested and questioned because the police suspected him of belonging to one of the groups involved. 

To the Authority, the appellant stated that his brother had been arrested only once, taken to court and sentenced but the reason for this arrest was unknown to the appellant.  In addition he conceded that his brother’s situation had no relevance to his own.  Faced with the evidence earlier provided in his lawyer’s letter, the appellant replied that he did not think he had said that, but perhaps he had been referring to his oldest son rather than his brother.  This unlikely explanation was rendered even more problematic given his own subsequent admission that his son had not in fact been arrested each Muharram but only twice at demonstrations.

The appellant emphasised the arrests of his son at the appeal hearing.  He had not mentioned this at all prior to or during the RSB interview (indeed, he had said that no one in his family had been arrest (apart from his brother)).  It was first revealed in the previously mentioned lawyer’s letter of 29 April 2002.  When asked why he had not told the refugee status officer earlier of his son’s arrest, he replied that he answered all questions which were asked.  This is an entirely unsatisfactorily reply assuming as it does some unwarranted prescience on the part of the refugee status officer regarding details of the appellant’s son’s experiences. 

Furthermore he told the Authority that his son was arrested solely on account of the appellant, not because of his son’s suspected involvement in any group.  However he had earlier told the RSB (in a letter from his counsel dated 29 April 2002) that the police suspected his son of involvement in "one of the groups".  The explanation he proffered for this discrepancy was that he did not know of his son’s affiliation to any group - an explanation which does not address this contradiction in his evidence.

The appellant also described how the police came to his home and took his photograph and a record of the address.  When asked why they needed a record of the very address they were raiding, his reply was, "It is a good question; I had moved in lots of places".  A reply which fails entirely to address the issue of the improbability of the police taking a record of an address which they already had. 

The Authority sought an explanation from the appellant as to why the police would be interested in him as a former SSP secretary some 12 years after leaving that position and renouncing all SSP activities at any level.  His reply was that the police were relying on their "old records" of the SSP.  The Authority does not accept that the police are interested in the appellant because of his innocuous activities as an SSP member some 12 years ago before that party began to use violence to promote their cause.  He did not continue to support them while overseas and has stated that he will not join them again while they pursue policies which are unacceptable to him.  There is absolutely no reason why the police would have any current interest in a minor political figure whose association with the SSP is historic.

This lack of interest is clearly apparent in the appellant’s ability to move back to his home village and cross the country’s borders frequently without hindrance.  The appellant returned to Pakistan in 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 without hindrance.  He was regular in his habits returning to Pakistan towards the end of each year and leaving in the early months of the following year.  It would have been a simple matter for any official of minimal competence to monitor his movements let alone a national police force.  His explanation for the ease of which he frequently crossed the border was that the Pakistan police lacked computers.

However not only did he encounter no problems with the officials at the borders but he also remained immune from interference in the intimacy of his village to which he returned and where he remained every year.  The police knew he lived there having visited the family home to make enquiries when there was sectarian disturbances.  Interestingly he described his annual sojourn in his home village as "safe", a description which attests to the lack of adverse interest in him from either the police or the TJP. 

(c) Well Foundedness

The appellant told the Authority that his fear of persecution derives from the fact that colleagues have been killed.  Country information was provided which reported on the endemic sectarian violence in Pakistan and the particular volatility of Muharram, the month of particular religious significance for Shias (Guardian Unlimited, Religious Violence Plagues Pakistan, 14/2/2002; BBC Home Page World Service, Pakistan Steps up Security, 13 April 2000; Pakistan’s Shia Sunni Divide, BBC News, 19 March 2002; BBC News 12 March 2002, Violence at Shia Funeral in Pakistan; CBS, 4 April 2002, Pakistan Arrests Al Qaeda Suspects). 

One report shows that the SSP have been banned by the government because of its links with radical Islamic groups supportive of the Taleban.  These and other articles provided to the RSB and to the Authority at the appeal hearing have all been considered in this decision.  Letters from the appellant’s family and the provincial secretary of the SSP report that Shia have murdered respected scholars and SSP leaders.  The appellant has no such profile.  He is not an SSP leader.  He has had no association with the SSP for the last 12 years.  Hence his ability to return annually for a safe holiday with his family from 1992 to 1995.

The appellant had told the RSB and confirmed to the Authority that he had been considering applying for refugee status since 1991 after the SSP leader had been assassinated and he himself was overseas.  This was the time when he had most recently been a member of the SSP and therefore was arguably at most risk from Shia and police.  However he did not apply for refugee status in Australia in 1992 because he was on a contract with the Muslim Federation in Australia and did not "want to make a fuss" as they were responsible for him.  When asked why he had returned each year to Pakistan at a time when he felt he was in danger, he replied that this was in accordance with the terms of his contract and the return air ticket had already been paid for by his employers.  He was asked also why he had not told them that he could not return to Pakistan because his life was in danger.  To this he replied with a non sequitur. 

When it was then suggested that his conduct in returning to Pakistan each year was not consistent with fearing death in Pakistan, he replied "you might think that way, but I have seen the death of colleagues I changed my residence here and there".  This is no answer to the alacrity with which he returned to Pakistan each year from 1992 to 1995 and failed to apply for refugee status until 1996 despite having considered this since 1991.

Summary

[41] The appellant is a Sunni Muslim cleric in a country where Sunni Muslims are the predominant religious group.  12 years ago he belonged to a recently banned Sunni group which he left as soon as it became involved in violence.  He has lived for several months in his home village to which he returned at the same time every year for four years and crossed the Pakistan border on numerous occasions without hindrance.  The appellant has never been personally harassed and has never been harmed by the police and is unsure whether it was Shia who instigated the only harm he has suffered in 1991.  He has suffered no serious harm in the past and there is no reason to suggest that he will be harmed on his return to his home village where he says he was "safe". 

[42] Since 1996 his family have continued to live there unharmed.  With the passing of the years he has distanced himself from the SSP and the chance of being associated with them by either the TJP or the authorities has diminished accordingly.
[43] The Authority concludes that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution in Pakistan.

CONCLUSION

[44] For the reasons mentioned above, the Authority finds the appellant is not a refugee within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention.  Refugee status is declined.  The appeal is dismissed.

........................................................

J Baddeley

Member