Supreme Court Cases
Supreme Court,
Wellington SC 69/2007; [2008] NZSC 48; [2008]
2 NZLR 579
17 April 2008; 20 June 2008
Elias CJ, Blanchard,
Tipping, McGrath and Wilson JJ
Immigration Act 1987 -
confidentiality - use of refugee evidence in other proceedings -
confidentiality of evidence given by refugee claimant - Immigration Act
1987, s 129T
Procedure of RSAA -
confidentiality - use of refugee evidence in other proceedings
including extradition proceedings or proceedings in New Zealand for
genocide or crimes against humanity
Procedure of RSAA -
precedence of refugee hearing - whether extradition proceedings or
proceedings in New Zealand for genocide or crimes against humanity to
take precedence over determination of claim to refugee status
Held:
1 The plain
wording of s 129T supported the interpretation that disclosure was
permitted to officials for the purpose of their considering the
extradition or prosecution of X (see paras [8] to [12]).
2 The term
"particulars" in s 129T(1) is to be construed as including not only the
application [for recognition as a refugee] as such but also any other
information produced in support of it (see
para [13]).
3 Section
129T(3)(b) imposes two conditions which must be satisfied before
disclosure is permitted under that paragraph. First, disclosure must be
to an officer or employee of a Government department or other Crown
agency. Secondly, the functions of that officer or employee must
"require" disclosure. The natural meaning of "Government department" in
this context could be taken from the definition of "Department" in s 2
of the State Sector Act 1988, which covers "any Department specified in
Schedule 1" to that Act. Similarly, the definition of "Crown agency" in
s 7 of the Crown Entities Act 2004, namely an agency listed in Part 1
of Schedule 1 of that Act, provided a helpful guide to the meaning of
that expression albeit in subsequent legislation. Knowledge is
"required" for the purpose of s 129T(3)(b) if that information is
relevant, in the sense of being rationally linked, to the function
which is being performed. Information in support of an application for
refugee status will never be relevant to the exercise of the functions
of most departments or agencies (see para [14]).
4 The
provisions of the Refugee Convention positively supported the
interpretation of the Supreme Court. Article 1F was intended to ensure
that war criminals could not escape extradition and prosecution by
claiming refugee status. That principal remained relevant, as did the
associated maxim aut dedere aut
judicare, which imposes an obligation to extradite or prosecute.
The ability of New Zealand to give effect to Article 1F(a) would be
prejudiced if s 129T(3)(b) were interpreted so as to exclude disclosure
to officers and employees considering extradition or prosecution (see
para [15]).
5 Section
129T, properly construed, permitted information about the application
of X for refugee status to be disclosed to officials who required that
information to consider his possible extradition for a crime of a type
described in Article 1F(a) or prosecution under the International
Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 (see para [16]).
1 Section
129T addresses both the use of information provided by an applicant for
refugee status and the disclosure, in limited and controlled
circumstances, of that information. As a general practice, it would be
preferable to determine the refugee application before addressing
possible disclosure because the outcome of the application may well
inform the question of disclosure. In the present case, the RSAA acted
correctly in attempting to resolve the application of X for refugee
status prior to the resolution of any question of extradition or
prosecution. In the event of prosecution, any issues which may arise
out of the application should be addressed by the High Court as and
when they arise (see para [17]).
2 The outcome
of the present appeal should not be seen as in any way detracting from
the importance of treating in strict confidence any information
provided in support of an application. It is entirely understandable
that statutory confidentiality should attach to the information, much
of it likely to be of a personal and sensitive nature, which an
applicant provides. The right to confidentiality should be modified
only to the extent strictly necessary to give effect to the limited
disclosure which s 129T permits (see para [18]).
3 It may be
sensible for the Department of Labour, which administers the
Immigration Act 1987, to consider the development and adoption of a
Code of Practice which could be published. Such code could lay out the
circumstances in which information may be disclosed under any of the
categories in s 129T(3), or under s 129T(4). It could usefully remind
recipients that they will commit an offence under s 129T(5) if they
themselves release the information contrary to the terms of the section
(see para [19]).
Judicial review proceedings brought by X against the Refugee Status Appeals Authority and the Attorney-General must fail, with judgment for both those respondents
Counsel
D B Collins QC, Solicitor-General, I C Carter and B J Keith for appellant
G M Illingworth QC and D A Manning for first respondent
No appearance for second respondent
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
A The appeal is allowed.
B The orders made in the Courts below are set aside and the application for judicial review is dismissed without costs.
Introduction
[1] The appellant, the
Attorney-General, appeals by leave on the question of:
[2] At the commencement of the
hearing, this Court renewed by consent the orders of the Courts below
suppressing publication of the name of the First Respondent and of any
particulars that might lead to his identification, and prohibiting
search of the Court file without the leave of the Court.
[3] The answer to the question
before the Court turns on the interpretation of s 129T, which reads as
follows:
[4] The first respondent, who is referred to as “X” to protect his anonymity, appealed to the second respondent, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority, against a decision of a Refugee Status Officer declining his application for refugee status. The Authority refused applications made to it by X for confidentiality to attach to the evidence, and for an adjournment until proceedings for extradition of X to Rwanda or criminal proceedings in New Zealand founded on his alleged actions in Rwanda,1 were finalised.2
[5] X brought proceedings in the High Court seeking judicial review of the decision of the Authority refusing his applications.3 Baragwanath J granted relief in the form of a declaration. He held that s 129T, and the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,4 afforded X an assurance of absolute confidentiality of all evidence filed in his appeal to the Authority. Any disclosure under s 129T(3)(b) could only be for the purpose of determining the claim for refugee status and not for any other purposes, including extradition or criminal prosecution in Rwanda or New Zealand.5 Alternatively, disclosure of the evidence of X beyond the Authority would prejudice any criminal trial and would if necessary be restrained by the High Court.6
[6] The Attorney-General appealed.7 In the Court of Appeal, counsel for X accepted that Baragwanath J’s interpretation of s 129T “was not required under the Convention or by associated state practice”.8 However, the majority of the Court (William Young P and Chambers J) held that, while the point was “closely balanced”,9 the approach of Baragwanath J to s 129T was broadly correct.10 It is proper, the majority held, to restrict the scope of the disclosure permitted by s 129T(3)(b) to those functions that are “incidental to or consequential upon” the determination of claims to refugee status; disclosure is therefore not permitted to “public servants”11 working in the areas of extradition or prosecution. In dissent, Ellen France J held that “there is nothing on a reading of s 129T to warrant imposition of a limitation to prevent disclosure to those in the extradition or prosecution areas” and, likewise, there is nothing “in the Convention or in state practice that warrants reading the section in the way favoured by the majority”.12
Interpretation of s 129T
[7] This appeal presents
a stark choice between two approaches to the interpretation of s 129T:
does the section restrict disclosure to officials engaged in the
determination of refugee status, as Baragwanath J and the majority of
the Court of Appeal held, or is disclosure also permitted to other
officials for the purposes of extradition or prosecution, as the
Authority and Ellen France J concluded?
[8] The plain wording of the
section supports the latter interpretation. All persons involved in the
determination of refugee status will, in terms of s 129T(1), be
“refugee status officers”, “the Authority”, or “other persons involved
in the administration of this Act”. The following word “and”
necessarily implies that the subsequent reference to “persons to whom
particulars are disclosed under subs (3)(a) or (b)” is to persons who
are not involved in an official capacity in refugee status
determination.
[9] That conclusion is supported by the wording of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subs (3). Paragraph (3)(a) permits disclosure to those, such as interpreters or witnesses, who are necessarily involved in determining the claims or matters to which subs (1) applies, but whose involvement is not in an official capacity. Paragraph (b) then permits disclosure to additional Government officials, beyond those specifically mentioned in s 129T(1), whose functions require disclosure. To interpret those words as referring only to officials engaged in the determination of refugee status would be to read them down unnecessarily and unjustifiably. It would also mean that Parliament had, for no apparent reason and within the same section, used very different wording to refer to the same category of person – those engaged in an official capacity in determining refugee status.
[10] It is significant that s
129T(3)(f) makes it clear that the confidentiality obligation imposed
by s 129T(1) does not apply if there is no serious possibility that
disclosure would endanger the safety of the claimant or any other
person. This exception demonstrates the primary rationale for the
confidentiality obligation.
[11] Section 129T(5) forms an important part of the scheme of the section by making it an offence to contravene, without reasonable excuse, the obligation of confidentiality imposed by s 129T(1). Those to whom information is disclosed under any of the categories set out in s 129(3) are subject to s 129T(5). They therefore must not themselves disclose the information unless they do so in conformity with one or more of the paragraphs of s 129T(3) or confidentiality has been waived under s 129T(4). Unless one of the paragraphs applies or confidentiality is waived, persons to whom disclosure is made under paragraph (b) may not themselves make a disclosure.
[12] As a matter of statutory
interpretation, s 129T(3)(b) therefore permits disclosure to those
referred to in that paragraph for the purpose of their considering the
extradition or prosecution of the first respondent. Four supplementary
questions do however arise:
We now address these questions.
[13] Section 129T(1) refers to the
“particulars” of the “case” of an applicant for refugee status. Section
129T(3) and (4) authorise the disclosure of those particulars in
specified circumstances. The term “particulars” should in this context
be construed as including not only the application as such but also any
other information produced in support of it. If the term were limited
to the conventional Court meaning of pleadings,13 the
protection which s 129T is plainly intended to provide would be
severely limited.
[14] Section 129T(3)(b) imposes two conditions which must be satisfied before disclosure is permitted under that paragraph. First, disclosure must be to an officer or employee of a Government department or other Crown agency. Secondly, the functions of that officer or employee must “require” disclosure. The natural meaning of “Government department” in this context can be taken from the definition of “Department” in s 2 of the State Sector Act 1988, which covers “any Department specified in Schedule 1” to that Act. Similarly, the definition of “Crown agency” in s 7 of the Crown Entities Act 2004, namely an agency listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to that Act, provides a helpful guide to the meaning of that expression albeit in subsequent legislation.14 Knowledge is “required” for the purpose of s 129T(3)(b) if that information is relevant, in the sense of being rationally linked, to the function which is being performed. Information in support of an application for refugee status will never be relevant to the exercise of the functions of most departments or agencies.
[15] As noted above,15
counsel for X acknowledged that the interpretation of s 129T adopted by
Baragwanath J was not required by the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, or by associated State practice. That was a proper
acknowledgement. In fact, the provisions of the Convention positively
support the competing interpretation. The Convention is given
recognition by s 129D of the Act, and is appended to it as Schedule 6.
Article 1F of the Convention provides that:
In a Convention
negotiated in the years following the Second World War, this provision
was intended to ensure that war criminals could not escape extradition
and prosecution by claiming refugee status. That principle remains
relevant, as does the associated maxim aut dedere aut judicare,16 which imposes an obligation to extradite or
prosecute. The ability of this country to give effect to Article 1F(a)
would be prejudiced if s 129T(3)(b) were interpreted so as to exclude
disclosure to officers and employees considering extradition or
prosecution.
Result
[16] Section 129T, properly construed, permits information about the application of X for refugee status to be disclosed to officials who require that information to consider his possible extradition for a crime of a type described in Article 1F(a) or prosecution under the International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act. It follows that the judicial review proceedings which X brought against the Authority and the Attorney-General must fail, with judgment for both those respondents. Neither seeks costs.
Comment
[17] Section 129T
addresses both the use of information provided by an applicant for
refugee status and the disclosure, in limited and controlled
circumstances, of that information. As a general practice, it will be
preferable to determine the application before addressing possible
disclosure because the outcome of the application may well inform the
question of disclosure. In the present case, the Authority acted
correctly in attempting to resolve the application of X for refugee
status prior to the resolution of any question of extradition or
prosecution. In the event of prosecution, any issues which may arise
out of the application should be addressed by the High Court as and
when they arise.
[18] The outcome of the present appeal should not be seen as in any way detracting from the importance of treating in strict confidence any information provided in support of an application. The purpose of s 129T is made clear by its heading: Confidentiality to be maintained. It is entirely understandable that statutory confidentiality should attach to the information, much of it likely to be of a personal and sensitive nature, which an applicant provides. The right to confidentiality should be modified only to the extent strictly necessary to give effect to the limited disclosure which s 129T permits.
[19] It may be sensible for the
Department of Labour, which administers the Immigration Act, to
consider the development and adoption of a Code of Practice which could
be published. Such code could lay out the circumstances in which
information may be disclosed under any of the categories of s 129T(3),
or under s 129T(4). It could usefully remind recipients that they will
commit an offence under s 129T(5) if they themselves release the
information contrary to the terms of the section.
Solicitors for Appellant: Crown
Law (Wellington)
Solicitors for First Respondent: Marshall
Bird & Curtis (Auckland)
Solicitors
for Second
Respondent: Edwards
Clark Dickie (Auckland)
1 Such a prosecution in New Zealand
is possible under the provisions of the International Crimes and
International Criminal Court Act 2000.
2 As the body
whose decision is subject to review, the second respondent followed the
appropriate course of advising by memorandum that it would abide the
decision of the Court and would not be represented at the hearing – see
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Maori Land Court
[1999] 1 NZLR 689 at pp 695–6.
3 X v Refugee Status Appeals Authority
(High Court, Auckland, CIV 2006-404-2650, 14 July 2006, Baragwanath J).
4 (1951) 189
UNTS 150.
5 At para [28].
6 At paras
[42], [55] and [66].
7 [2007] NZCA
388.
8 At para [43].
9 At para [47].
10 At para
[51].
11 The Court
of Appeal used this term for ease of reference in lieu of the statutory
expression “officer or employee of a Government department or other
Crown agency”.
12 At paras
[64] and [65], respectively.
13 As in r 185 of
the High Court Rules.
14 The definition
of “Crown entity” in s 2 of the Public Finance Act 1989 was the most
relevant reference in legislation in force in 1999, when s 129T was
enacted.
15 At para [6].
16 Literally,
“either surrender or submit to justice”. As Jennings and Watts state in
Oppenheim’s International Law
(9th ed, 1996), p 953: “Several multilateral treaties … have adopted
the practice of obliging parties either to extradite persons found on
their territory but wanted for trial… by another party, or to try such
persons themselves. This principle of aut
dedere aut judicare has, for example, been adopted in [named
treaties]”.