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Y  v  Refugee Status Appeals Authority

High Court Auckland M No. 1803/98
13 August 1999; 19 August 1999
Smellie J

Judicial review - Reasonableness - Challenge to finding of fact

The plaintiff, a citizen of Iran, converted to Christianity subsequent to his arrival in New Zealand.  Applying the benefit of the doubt, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) concluded that the conversion was genuine.  The RSAA also accepted that according to the Sharia law, applicable in Iran, conversion from Islam to Christianity is officially punishable by death.  But relying on what it regarded as a thorough investigation by the Swedish Aliens Appeal Board, it concluded that the law in question for all practical purposes is never implemented; and consequently there was no real chance, if the plaintiff was obliged to return to Iran as a practising Christian, that he would either suffer persecution or even serious harassment.  On judicial review the issue was whether there was evidence before the RSAA which justified this conclusion.

Held:

1    The RSAA was justified in basing its decision on the research carried out by the Swedish Aliens Appeal Board.  It was the only document produced during the hearing which expressly addressed the situation of the plaintiff and provided ample grounds on which the RSAA could reach its conclusion that refugee status should not be accorded to the plaintiff.  There was no room to suggest that no reasonable RSAA could have reached the decision under review (see paras [17] & [21]).

Application for review dismissed

Other cases mentioned in judgment
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Counsel
M I Koya for the plaintiff
A Markham for the respondent

SMELLIE J

Introduction

[1] This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Status Appeal Authority (RSAA) brought by the plaintiff who was refused refugee status.  The plaintiff's name was suppressed before the Authority and that suppression will continue so far as this High Court proceeding is concerned.

Background

[2] The plaintiff arrived in New Zealand on 1st October 1993 and applied for refugee status.  He claimed political persecution in his own country Iran.  He was interviewed by the Refugee Status Branch of the Immigration Service in October 1993 and by letter dated 26th January 1994 advised that his application was declined.

[3] The plaintiff appealed that decision to the RSAA.  The hearing took place in February 1996.  The decision was handed down in March 1997 dismissing the appeal.

[4] Then on 26th May 1997 the plaintiff filed a second application with the Refugee Status Branch, this time alleging fear of religious persecution in Iran.  The plaintiff claimed that during his time in New Zealand he had converted from Islam to Christianity and joined the Roman Catholic Church.

[5] The Refugee Status Branch rejected his application by letter on 31st October 1997 and the plaintiff then filed an appeal against that decision with the RSAA.  The second appeal was heard in March 1998 and in July 1998 the appeal was dismissed.

[6] This application for judicial review was then filed.  The grounds of complaint being as follows:

[7] The ground that the interpreter was incompetent was abandoned when Mr Koya opened the case.  But that the Authority had reached wrong or insupportable conclusions on the evidence and committed errors of law by following the findings of the Swedish Aliens Appeal Board was pursued.

The decision of the RSAA

[8] In its decision the RSAA gave the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and concluded that his conversion to Christianity in New Zealand was genuine.  Initially it appears there was some doubt as whether it was purely a matter of convenience to secure a basis for obtaining refugee status.  But the evidence of those who prepared the plaintiff for baptism and instructed him prior to that carried the day.

[9] Before the RSAA the plaintiff's evidence was that he had telephoned one of his 5 siblings in Iran and had been pressed as to when he was returning home.  That it was under those circumstances that he had disclosed that he could not return because of his conversion.  His evidence was that this sibling, who is female, was shocked and disapproving.  He assumed, however, that she would have told the other members of his family (his parents are both dead) and that they would have told other people, so that inevitably the fact of his conversion would have come to the attention of the Authorities.

[10] In its decision the Tribunal did not accept that the plaintiff had told his sister of his conversion.  More importantly, however, it also held that if he had told his sister, because she disapproved and because the fact of his conversion would be a matter of great embarrassment to the family it was implausible that either she or other members of the family would have noised the fact abroad so that it came to the attention of the Authorities.

[11] The plaintiff also argued that the Islamic law of Iran provides that one who ceases to be a Moslem and converts to Christianity commits a capital offence.  The RSAA accepted that such a law exists in Iran.  But relying upon what it obviously regarded as a thorough investigation by the Swedish Aliens Appeal Board, it concluded that the law in question for all practical purposes is never implemented.  And consequently there was no real chance, if the plaintiff was obliged to returned to Iran as a practising Christian, that he would either suffer persecution or even serious harassment.

The arguments in this Court

[12] Mr Koya endeavoured to persuade me that the Tribunal's conclusion rejecting the plaintiff's evidence that he had disclosed his conversion to his sister should be overturned.  The transcript does not, in fact, bear out the way the Tribunal recorded this issue.  The evidence is not that the plaintiff rang his sister to tell her of his conversion, but rather he rang her as a matter of maintaining a normal family contact and felt himself obliged to explain why he could not return when she pressed him for an answer.  That, however, in my judgment, is all rather beside the point.  The fact is the plaintiff does not know whether his sister kept the information to herself and, if she did not, how far beyond the family it has gone.  It is pure supposition on his part that the Authorities have come to know of it.  Furthermore, the inference the RSAA drew was that because the family would be embarrassed and possibly prejudiced by this information becoming common knowledge, the greater probability is that it has not been passed on.  That, in my opinion, was a conclusion well open in all the circumstances.

[13] The contention that the plaintiff was unfairly called upon to comment upon the press release of the Swedish Aliens Appeal Board is without substance.  The central contention of the Board had already been put to the plaintiff at the Refugee Status Board stage of the inquiry.  Furthermore, the transcript makes it very clear that the Authority was anxious to give both the plaintiff and his representative every opportunity to look at the document and comment upon it.  The opportunity was not taken up even after the Tribunal had gone to some lengths to point out why they regarded the document of such significance and that in fact it had been relied upon in an earlier appeal hearing to refuse refugee status.

[14] Finally, the central thrust of the appeal was that given the undisputed fact that the law of Iran provides that a convert from Islam can be prosecuted and if convicted face the death penalty, that provided a complete answer to any argument that there is no real chance that if the plaintiff returned he would be persecuted.

[15] At the end of submissions it seemed to me that there was only one issue in the case.  Namely, whether there was evidence before the Tribunal which justified it in taking the view that despite the capital offence existing in Iran the plaintiff would not be in any real danger of it being used against him if he returned as a genuine Christian convert, especially if he did not seek to evangelize or proselytize.

Decision

[16] The "Country Information", (as it is called in refugee jurisprudence), produced by the plaintiff indicated that from time to time Christians in Iran who evangelize get into trouble.  Not so much with the State but, rather, Islamic fundamentalists and vigilantes who tend to take things into their own hands.  The sources of the material provided by the plaintiff before the RSAA were from such organisations as Amnesty International, the United States State Department and a miscellany of newspaper articles and other publications.  Mr Koya criticised the Tribunal for not taking that information into account and concluding that, in fact, there would be a real danger for the plaintiff if he returned.  There was, however, no evidence that the applicant wished or intended to evangelize or proselytize and direct evidence that he was not required to by his Church.

[17] In my judgement, the RSAA was justified in basing its decision upon the research carried out by the Swedish Alien Appeals Board.

The Swedish Alien Appeals Board Press Release

[18] That document is so crucial that it is set out in full hereunder.  In summary, however, whilst acknowledging that conversion from Islam to Christianity is officially punishable by death, the document demonstrates convincingly, as a result of the investigations of a delegation that went to Iran to see for itself, that draconian law is so unlikely to be invoked that there is no real danger.  I note, in particular, the statement at the top of the second page reading:

And the penultimate paragraph which reads: [19] Initially during the hearing, I was anxious to explore the difference between a nominal conversion which would not be taken seriously in Iran when the national returned and a genuine conversion such as the plaintiff's, involving him practising Christianity upon his return.  I am satisfied, however, that in either case the evidence shows there is no real danger.  In the case of the genuine convert the two passages I have quoted above provide ample grounds upon which the Authority could reach its conclusion that refugee status should not be accorded to the plaintiff.

[20] Additionally, the Swedish document is the only document that was produced during the hearing which expressly addresses the situation in which the plaintiff now is.  The document reads as follows.
 

PRESS RELEASE 11.01.96
IRANIANS WHO HAVE CONVERTED TO CHRISTIANITY CAN RETURN HOME
[21] In all the circumstances the plaintiff has failed to persuade me that there was any procedural defect or breach of natural justice during the hearing.  He has also failed to persuade me that the RSAA failed to take into account matters it should have or, alternatively, took into account irrelevant matters.  The Swedish Alien Appeals Board press release demonstrates that there is no room in this case for the suggestion that contrary to the Wednesbury principle, no reasonable Authority could have reached the decision under review here.

[22] The relief claimed here is refused.

Costs

[23] I was not informed whether or not the plaintiff had brought this action on legal aid.  If that be the case there is no room for an award of costs.  Alternatively, if the Minister seeks costs he will have leave to file a memorandum, which is to be no more than 2 pages within 7 days.  The plaintiff may reply within 7 days, again in a memorandum no longer than 2 pages.
 

Solicitor for the plaintiff:  M I Koya (Auckland)
Solicitor for the respondent:  Crown Solicitor (Auckland)